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The Nuclear Weapons Industry
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 62, Heft 5, S. 1250
ISSN: 2327-7793
The CIS nuclear weapons industry
In: Jane's Intelligence review: the magazine of IHS Jane's Military and Security Assessments Intelligence centre, Band 4, Heft 9, S. 387-392
ISSN: 1350-6226
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
US nuke panel packed with weapons industry interests
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
This article was co-published with the Guardian.Nine of the 12 members of a high-level congressional committee charged with advising on the U.S.'s nuclear weapons strategy have direct financial ties to contractors that would benefit from the report's recommendations or are employed at think tanks that receive considerable funding from weapons manufacturers, the Guardian and Responsible Statecraft can reveal.While the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (CCSPUS) purports to recommend steps to avoid nuclear conflict, it does nothing to disclose its own potential conflicts of interest with the weapons industry in its final report or at rollout events at think tanks in Washington.The United States will soon face "a world where two nations [China and Russia] possess nuclear arsenals on par with our own," warned the commission's final report, released in mid-October. "In addition," the report charged, "the risk of conflict with these two nuclear peers is increasing. It is an existential challenge for which the United States is ill-prepared."According to the CCSPUS, this potential doomsday scenario requires the U.S. to make "necessary adjustments to the posture of US nuclear capabilities – in size and/or composition," a policy shift that would steer billions of taxpayer dollars to the Pentagon and nuclear weapons contractors."What we've consistently seen is the nuclear weapons industry buying influence and that means we cannot make serious decisions about our security when the industry is buying influence through think tanks and commissioners they are skewing the debate," said Susi Snyder, program coordinator at the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons."Instead of having a debate about the tools and materials we need to make ourselves safe," she added, "we're having a debate about which company should get the contracts. And that doesn't make the American people safe or anyone else in the world."The CCSPUS was established two years ago via the annual defense policy bill, and conflicts of interest on the commission were apparent from the beginning. But an analysis by the Guardian and Responsible Statecraft found deep ties between the commission and the weapons industry.The most recognizable member of the CCSPUS is its vice-chair, Jon Kyl, who served as a senator from Arizona from 1995 to 2013 and again in 2018, after the death of John McCain. While this, and more, is included in his biography in the commission's report, what's left out is his more recent employment as a senior adviser with the law firm Covington & Burling, whose lobbying client list includes multiple Pentagon contractors that would benefit from the commission's recommendations.In 2017 Kyl, personally, was registered to lobby for Northrop Grumman, which manufactures the B-21 nuclear bomber that the commission recommends increasing the number the U.S. plans to buy, at a cost to taxpayers of nearly $700 million each.Kyl did not respond to questions about his employment status with Covington & Burling, but the former senator was listed as a "senior adviser" on the firm's website until at least December 1, 2022, nearly 10 months after the commissioner selections for the CCSPUS were announced in March 2022.Another commissioner, Franklin Miller, is a principal at the Scowcroft Group, a business advisory firm that describes Miller as having expertise in "nuclear deterrence," and acknowledges its work in the weapons sector."The Scowcroft Group successfully advised a European defense leader on a strategic acquisition opportunity," says the consulting firm in the "Defense/Aerospace" section of its website. "We have also assisted a major defense firm in pursuing global partnerships and co-production opportunities."Miller did not respond to a request for comment about the identity of the Scowcroft Group's clients.Kyl and Miller are joined on the CCSPUS by retired general John E Hyten, who previously served as the vice-chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the second-highest-ranking member of the U.S. military.While Hyten's biography in the commission's report lauds his extensive military service, in retirement he has worked closely with a number of firms that could benefit immensely from the commission's recommendations.This March he was appointed as special adviser to the CEO of C3 AI, an artificial intelligence company that boasts of working with numerous agencies at the Department of Defense. In June 2022, Hyten was named executive director of the Blue Origins foundation, called the Club for the Future, and as a strategic adviser to Blue Origin's senior leadership. Blue Origin is wholly owned by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, and works directly with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the air force and the space force on space launch-related capabilities.Hyten's ties to these firms are notable given the CCSPUS report's repeated overtures for improving and investing in space and artificial intelligence capabilities. Specifically, the report recommends the United States "urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture" and take steps to ensure it is "at the cutting edge of emerging technologies – such as big data analytics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI)."Hyten did not respond to a request for comment.The CCSPUS also included think tank scholars whose employers receive significant funding from the arms industry. Two commission members work at the Hudson Institute, which, according to its most recent annual report, received in excess of $500,000 from Pentagon contractors in 2022. This includes six-figure donations from some of the Pentagon's top contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems.On Monday, October 23, the Hudson Institute held an event to highlight the CCSPUS's report that included the two Hudson Institute employees who also served as commissioners. The event unabashedly promoted recommendations from the report that would be a financial windfall for Hudson's funders. The landing page for the event features a photo of a B-21 stealth bomber, the same photo used in the commission report that also recommended that the U.S. strategic nuclear posture be modified to "increase the planned number of B-21 bombers and tankers an expanded force would require."Neither at the event nor in the report is it noted that the plane's manufacturer, Northrop Grumman, is in the Hudson Institute's highest donor tier, contributing in excess of $100,000 in 2022.The Hudson Institute staff who served as commissioners did not respond to requests for comment.Another commissioner, Matthew Kroenig, is a vice-president at the Atlantic Council, a prominent DC think tank which, according to the organization's most recent annual report, is funded by several top Pentagon contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon (now RTX), General Atomics, Saab and GM Defense. The Atlantic Council also receives more than $1 million a year directly from the Department of Defense and between $250,000 and $499,999 from the Department of Energy, which helps manage the nation's nuclear arsenal.These seeming conflicts of interest were not mentioned at any point in the CCSPUS's report or at an Atlantic Council event promoting the report and featuring the same photo of the B-21 used by the Hudson Institute and the commission.Kroenig did not respond to a request for comment.Even commissioners whose careers had included positions that were notably critical of nuclear weapons had recently established ties with firms that profit from the nuclear and conventional weapons industry.Commissioner Lisa Gordon-Hagerty worked for years at the pinnacle of nuclear weapons policy in the U.S., including positions on the national security council, the U.S. House of Representatives and the Department of Energy. She was also the director of the Federation of American Scientists, a non-profit organization known for advocating for reductions in nuclear weapons globally. Her last government position prior to joining the commission was serving as the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is responsible for military applications of nuclear science. She resigned from the post in 2020, allegedly after heated disagreements with the secretary of energy, who tried to cut NNSA funding.While much of her career is mentioned in the commission report, what's left out is that Gordon-Hagerty has also been cashing in on her nuclear expertise. After leaving the NNSA, in 2021 she joined the board and became director of strategic programs at Westinghouse Government Services, a nuclear weapons contractor that has been paid hundreds of millions of dollars for work with the Department of Defense and Department of Energy.Gordon-Hagerty did not respond to a request for comment.Like Gordon-Hagerty, fellow commissioner Leonor Tomero had a distinguished career at the highest levels of nuclear weapons policy. According to her bio in the commission report, she was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy and served for over a decade on the House Armed Services Committee as counsel and strategic forces subcommittee staff lead, where her portfolio included the establishment of the U.S. space force, nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear cleanup, arms control and missile defense.Outside government, Tomero was Director of Nuclear non-proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, an organization that has repeatedly called for reductions in the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Tomero is also on the board of the Council for a Livable World, which explicitly states that its goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons.Yet, in September, Tomero became a vice president of government Relations at JA Green & Company, a lobbying firm whose client list includes a host of military contractors that could see revenues soar if the CCSPUS's recommendations are adopted. Space X, for example — which pays $50,000 every three months to JA Green for lobbying related to "issues related to national security space launch" — would probably benefit mightily from the commission recommendation that "the United States urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive elements to ensure US access to and operations in space.""No clients of JA Green & Company sought to influence the work of the Commission or the Commission's recommendations in any way," said Jeffrey A Green, president of JA Green, in an email. "We follow all applicable ethics rules and there are no conflicts of interest."None of the potential conflicts of interest between commissioners' financial interests and the policy proposals laid out in their final report were disclosed by the CCSPUS itself within its final report or at any public event highlighting its findings.While many commissioners did not respond to requests for comment, the commission's executive director, William A Chambers, provided a statement on behalf of the CCSPUS and its members."Members of [the commission] were chosen and appointed by Members of Congress based on their national recognition and significant depth of experience in such professions as governmental service, law enforcement, the Armed Forces, law, public administration, intelligence gathering, commerce, or foreign affairs," wrote Chambers. "Before they began performing their role as Commissioners, they were instructed on the ethics rules that govern congressional entities and were required to comply with rules set forth by the Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate and the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives."Chambers did not respond to a request for a copy of the ethics rules.But the opacity about potential conflicts of interest leaves some experts questioning the CCSPUS's recommendations."There's a huge argument raging over what is security, how much does it rely on transparency and, especially when it comes to nuclear weapons, there is a call for greater transparency," said Snyder of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. "That light they're asking to shine on China, North Korea and Iran is a light they also need to shine on their own decision-making."
Spear from the north: Norway's guided weapon industry
In: Jane's defence weekly: JDW, Band 45, Heft 43, S. 30-37
ISSN: 0265-3818
World Affairs Online
Big US investors prop up the nuclear weapons industry
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
Nuclear weapons aren't just a threat to human survival, they're a multi-billion-dollar business supported by some of the biggest institutional investors in the U.S. according to new data released today by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and PAX, the largest peace organization in the Netherlands. For the third year in a row, globally, the number of investors in nuclear weapons producers has fallen but the overall amount invested in these companies has increased, largely thanks to some of the biggest investment banks and funds in the U.S."As for the U.S., while there is, like past years, indeed a dominance, and total financing from U.S.-based institutions has increased, the total number of U.S. investors has dropped for the third year in a row (similar to our global findings), and we hope to see this number will continue to fall in the coming years," Alejandar Munoz, the report's primary author, told Responsible Statecraft.In 2023, the top 10 share and bondholders of nuclear weapons producing companies are all American firms. The firms — Vanguard, Capital Group, State Street, BlackRock, Wellington Management, Fidelity Investments, Newport Group, Geode Capital Holdings, Bank of America and Morgan Stanley — held $327 billion in investments in nuclear weapons producing companies in 2023, an $18 billion increase from 2022.These companies are also profiting from the enormous government contracts they receive for developing and modernizing nuclear weapons. "All nuclear-armed states are currently modernizing their nuclear weapon systems," says the annual "Don't Bank on the Bomb" report from PAX and ICAN. "In 2022, the nine nuclear-armed states together spent $82.9 billion on their nuclear weapons arsenals, an increase of $2.5 billion compared to the previous year, and with the United States spending more than all other nuclear powers combined."American weapons companies are some of the biggest recipients of contracts for nuclear weapons. Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics are "the biggest nuclear weapons profiteers," according to the report. Combined, the two American weapons manufacturers have outstanding nuclear weapons related contracts with a combined potential value of at least $44.9 billion.Those enormous government contracts for nuclear weapons, alongside contracts for conventional weapons, have helped make nuclear weapons producers an attractive investment for American investment banks and funds. "Altogether, 287 financial institutions were identified for having substantial financing or investment relations with 24 companies involved in nuclear weapon production," says the report. "$477 billion was held in bonds and shares, and $343 billion was provided in loans and underwriting."The report notes that while the total amount invested in nuclear weapons has increased, the number of investors has fallen and trends toward firms in countries with nuclear weapons.ICAN and PAX suggest that concentration may be a result of prohibitions on nuclear weapons development for signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), a 93 signatory treaty committing to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The report says:The TPNW comprehensively prohibits the development, manufacturing, testing, possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as assistance with those acts. For companies that build the key components needed to maintain and expand countries' nuclear arsenals, access to private funding is crucial. As such, the banks, pension funds, asset managers and other financiers that continue to invest in or grant credit to these companies allow for the production of inhumane and indiscriminate weapons to proceed. By divesting from their business relationships with these companies, financial institutions can reduce available capital for nuclear weapon related activities and thereby be instrumental in supporting the fulfilment of the TPNW's objectives.Susi Snyder, managing director of the Don't Bank on the Bomb Project, told Responsible Statecraft that even U.S. banks, like Pittsburgh based PNC Bank, are facing shareholder pressure to divest from nuclear weapons and that the tide may be shifting as shareholders in U.S. companies grow increasingly sensitive to investments in nuclear weapons. "For three years shareholder resolutions have been put forward at PNC bank raising concerns that their investments in nuclear weapon producers are a violation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and that they are not in line with the bank's overall human rights policy guidelines," she said.
Toward the privatization of the CIS weapons industry: The ?collectivist? option
In: Economics of planning: an international journal devoted to the study of comparative economics, planning and development, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 143-160
ISSN: 1573-0808
Land of nuclear enchantment: a New Mexican history of the nuclear weapons industry
"In this thoughtful social history of New Mexico's nuclear industry, Lucie Genay traces the scientific colonization of the state in the twentieth century from the points-of-view of the local people, including Hispanics, Native Americans, and Anglos. Genay focuses on personal experiences in relation to postwar socioeconomic and cultural changes rather than on Cold War policy and political and scientific figures in order to give a sense of the upheaval that accompanied the rise of the nuclear era. She gives voice to the Hispanics and Native Americans of the Jémez Plateau, the blue-collar workers of Los Alamos, the miners and residents of the Grants Uranium Belt, and the ranchers and farmers who were affected by the federal appropriation of land in White Sands Missile Range and whose lives were upended by the Trinity test and the US government's reluctance to address the 'collateral damage' of the work at the Range. Genay reveals the far-reaching implications to the residents of New Mexico as the state acquired a new identity from its embrace with nuclear science"--
In a bull market for arms, weapons industry lobbyists push products, not policy
In: Congressional quarterly weekly report, Band 38, S. 3201-3206
ISSN: 0010-5910, 1521-5997
The weapons industry has a 'need for speed' but can be accident prone
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
President Biden requested more than $24 billion for Ukraine and associated assistance, making use of the debt deal loophole that excluded the Pentagon from spending caps imposed on other agencies. Within a week of Biden's request, a new Pentagon reform panel published a report on its work to improve the department's adaptability.
It's an interim report, and lawmakers can't miss the opportunity to weigh in on the recommendations the commission has yet to finalize. Congress will soon have to consider the president's Ukraine aid request while heeding calls for greater oversight of that aid — a task complicated by the fact that the House and Senate disagree on the need for a special watchdog for Ukraine.
But the Pentagon reform panel's reporting directly impacts the U.S. ability to arm Ukraine going forward and should be a priority for lawmakers upon their imminent return to Capitol Hill.
Congress established the panel — formally named the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform — to review and improve the Pentagon's acquisition and budgeting processes, which are notoriously cumbersome. In pursuit of that effort, the commission is requesting feedback on several proposals intended to promote innovation and adaptability at the Pentagon.
One proposal gives the department more time to obligate funds while another grants the department the redistribution power "to ingest new technology and innovation or pivot effectively to an unplanned requirement without disrupting already spoken for resources."
Some budget flexibility could help the department better adapt to potential national security threats, but lawmakers should be wary of proposals that further solidify military contractors' influence on defense policy. Too often, efforts to "advance innovation" turn into reforms primarily focused on hastening the defense acquisition process and scapegoating oversight measures as the root of all ills.
Time and again stakeholders assert that red tape and budget inflexibility inhibit the department from delivering new capabilities to warfighters. But, as RAND expert Jonathan Wong has pointed out, overly focusing on acquisition speed can also introduce unintended consequences, like costly sustainment issues (or profitable ones, depending on who you ask). Ensuring warfighters have the resources they need — when they need them — to do their jobs effectively requires contractor accountability, in addition to a streamlined PPBE process.
In fact, contractor accountability should be top of mind for lawmakers reviewing the commission's recommendations for PPBE reform. That means challenging assumptions about what hampers innovation in the first place. The defense industry — well represented in the PPBE commission — claims that it can't invest in innovative technologies for the warfighters of tomorrow.
The commission appears to agree with this, writing that one of the root causes of the department's issues with innovation and adaptability is a "bias toward existing and traditional programs and approaches." Commissioners explain that existing programs have a "leg up" in the PPBE process because they're "not properly incentivized to spend money on new, innovative solutions that are riskier and need more time to develop." They go even further by saying that "faced with a choice between buying down risk and improving performance on existing program content or taking on additional risk by spending money on new, untested program content, most Services seem likely to choose the conservative option."
Tell that to taxpayers, who are footing the bill on at least a $1.7 trillion aircraft program with far greater issues than benefits, despite being marketed as the "the most advanced fighter aircraft in the world."
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is another great example of juice not worth the squeeze, with the Navy attempting to retire several before they reach maturity for at least 2 years running. And with good reason — the LCS doesn't do much for the Navy. But what's so egregious about the LCS is that it failed for the same reason the F-35 program did — the Pentagon started development before the design and thorough testing were completed.
In other words, the Pentagon's need for speed created lagging performance and unforeseen sustainment costs. In the F-35's case, sustainment costs are the main reason the program is now the most expensive in U.S. history. The Pentagon's alleged aversion to risk didn't stop it from prematurely fielding these weapons, which now deliver little capability to warfighters on the hard-working taxpayer's dime.
Lawmakers should question how risk-averse the department really is (especially when authorizing funding) and consider the external factors that hamper innovation and adaptability — namely, military contractors' unwillingness to invest internally. Bureaucracy is no doubt a problem, but so are military contractors that consistently enrich their shareholders at the expense of internal investments needed to innovate.
Case in point: The defense industry increased cash paid to shareholders by 73% in the 2010s as compared to the 2000s. By contrast, contractor spending on internal capital investments and independent research decreased — despite improved profit margins and cash generation industry-wide over the same period. So the issue isn't just bureaucracy — it's also corporate greed.
Indeed, the defense industry has claimed that profits are "insufficient to finance" investments, requiring private financing to advance the development of innovative technologies. Even assuming that's generally true (which it isn't, according to the Pentagon), the government ultimately reimburses most research and development costs, generating free revenue, profits, and cash flow for companies.
Nevertheless, the interim report partially validates industry's claim that it can't afford investments toward innovation. Commissioners wrote that the PPBE process isn't responsive enough to attract private capital to develop "emerging technologies or manufacturing capacity."
The commission neglects to mention the size and scale of this so-called capital deficit. Surely commissioners aren't exclusively referring to small businesses, which certainly lack the financial wherewithal to pursue innovation independently but are also generally limited in their ability to fundraise. So how do the commission's findings fit with data indicating that the industry is quite financially capable of innovation?
The commission's scope is limited to understanding and evaluating the challenges within the PPBE process to improve it, but lawmakers are tasked with putting the commission's input in context. Contentious debates on Ukraine aid and its oversight surely await them, but the PPBE reform process deserves their time and attention, as it will have lasting effects on U.S. ability to both provide aid and ensure it's spent effectively.
Guns for the sultan: military power and the weapons industry in the Ottoman Empire
In: Cambridge studies in Islamic civilisation
Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire (review)
In: The journal of military history, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 218-219
ISSN: 1543-7795
Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire (review)
In: The journal of military history, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 218
ISSN: 0899-3718
War Crimes, Etc.: The ATS Case Against the U.S. Weapons Industry for Aiding and Abetting Atrocities in Yemen
In: Florida Journal of International Law, Band 31
SSRN